This study examines Morteza Motahhari’s critical view of Sayyid Qutb through the relationship among empirical science, philosophical reason, and revelation within the project of reviving Islamic thought. The problem arises from an ambiguity in the scope of Motahhari’s judgment: he explicitly places Qutb among Muslim writers who, in his account, gave prominence to the empirical study of nature in theology and moved away from philosophical reasoning. Yet Qutb’s own writings contain a clear critique of scientific exegesis of the Qur’an, delimit the authority of empirical science, and reject the use of changing scientific theories as criteria for Qur’anic truth. Employing a qualitative, document-based, comparative approach, the study examines a defined corpus of Qutb’s primary writings together with a comprehensive survey of Motahhari’s published works relevant to Qutb and the intellectual current under examination. The findings reveal agreement between the two thinkers regarding the legitimacy of empirical inquiry, the civilizational importance of science, and the inability of science to provide a comprehensive interpretation of existence. Their principal disagreement concerns the epistemic authority of philosophical reasoning in questions that lie beyond the scope of empirical inquiry. Qutb assigns the Qur’anic method and revelation the primary role in forming the Islamic conception and limits the autonomous authority of philosophical traditions and systems. Motahhari, by contrast, regards philosophical reasoning as a valid and necessary route for developing Qur’anic theology. Accordingly, the strongest textual support for Motahhari’s judgment concerns Qutb’s restriction of philosophical authority in religious knowledge, whereas Qutb’s own writings do not support attributing scientism or scientific exegesis of the Qur’an to him.