http://jstmt.ut.ac.ir

Social Theories of Muslim Thinkers

ISSN
Print: 2538-5240
Online: 2783-3216

# Event and Horizon-Opening: A Phenomenological Critique of Ultimate Referentiality in Social Movements

**Saeid Sharifi**[1] ✉, **and Peyman Vahabzadeh**[2] ✉

1. Professor, Department of Cultural Management and Planning, Isf.C., Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran. Visiting Scholar, Department of Sociology, University of Victoria, BC, Canada. (Corresponding author) Email: sa.sharifi7584@iau.ir
2. Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Victoria, BC, Canada. Email: peymanv@uvic.ca

## Article Info

**Article type:**
Research Article

**Article history:**
Received: 12 April 2026
Received in revised form: 21 June 2026
Accepted: 11 August 2026
Published online: 23 September 2026

**Keywords:**
Event, Horizon-Opening, Islamic Thought, Social Movements, Ultimate Referentiality.

## ABSTRACT

This article examines the dialogue between structuralist and phenomenological approaches in contemporary Islamic social thought through the lens of Peyman Vahabzadeh's radical phenomenology. Adopting a qualitative, descriptive–analytical approach, the study draws on documentary and conceptual analysis of primary sources, including Vahabzadeh's *Articulated Experiences* (2003), Kuntowijoyo's *Islam Sebagai Ilmu* (2006), and Hanafi's *Min al-'Aqidah ila al-Thawrah* (1966), as well as secondary literature on these thinkers. The research addresses a theoretical gap: while structuralist frameworks such as Kuntowijoyo's transcendental structuralism and phenomenological approaches such as Hanafi's actual theology have shaped Islamic social theory, both remain entangled with forms of "ultimate referentiality" that foreclose the "evental" and "horizon-opening" dimensions of social movements. Drawing on Vahabzadeh's critique of foundationalism and his "sociology of possibilities," the study develops a synthetic framework that integrates structural analysis with phenomenological attention to lived experience. The analysis proceeds in four phases: conceptual identification, comparative analysis, critique of ultimate referentiality, and synthesis. It argues that Kuntowijoyo's framework treats divine revelation as an ultimate referent, while Hanafi's phenomenological theology remains committed to theocentric foundations. The proposed framework combines structural analysis as horizon-mapping, phenomenological attention to lived experience, evental rupture and horizon-opening, and reflexive critique of ultimate referentiality. It offers analytical resources for understanding contemporary social movements in Muslim societies as generative phenomena that disrupt sedimented meanings while gesturing toward new possibilities. By bridging phenomenological social theory and social movement studies, this inquiry contributes to a post-foundational Islamic social theory that takes seriously the "open expanse of possible futures" toward which social movements gesture.

**Cite this article:** Sharifi, S., & Vahabzadeh, P. (2026). Event and Horizon-Opening: A Phenomenological Critique of Ultimate Referentiality in Social Movements. *Social Theories of Muslim Thinkers*, 16(3), 135—153. https://doi.org/10.22059/jstmt.2026.420788.1921

© Author(s) retain the copyright. **Publisher:** University of Tehran Press.
**DOI:** https://doi.org/10.22059/jstmt.2026.420788.1921

## Introduction

Contemporary social movements arise not merely as reactions to structural inequalities but also from lifeworlds (*Lebenswelten*) experiencing systemic rupture. The lifeworld, understood as the prereflective, taken-for-granted horizon of everyday life, is not static but a historically sedimented field of meaning constituted through collective practices and intersubjective horizons of possibility that render the world natural and uncontested (Steinbock, 1995). Yet contemporary conditions extend beyond individual rupture to encompass collective and systemic destabilization of normality for entire communities, producing what has been theorized as "ambivalent normality": a chronic tension between reconstructed concordance and preserved optimality that renders normality fragile and perpetually contested (Yasna, 2025). The "we-experience of destroyed lifeworlds" reveals a critical theoretical gap: while phenomenology has extensively theorized plural perspectives and individual ruptures, their conjunction in experiences that are simultaneously collective and systemically disruptive remains undertheorized (Yasna, 2025). This lacuna is especially consequential amid global lifeworld crises intensified by digital worldliness, in which taken-for-granted meanings lose validity for large populations as a shared existential condition (Carlisle, 2017).

Within social movement theory, the phenomenological dimension of collective action has been notably neglected. Classical frameworks, resource mobilization (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), political opportunity structures (Tarrow, 1994), and framing theory (Snow & Benford, 1988), address structural and strategic dynamics but operate at the level of mechanisms, neglecting the experiential and existential dimensions of collective action. Even framing theory treats meaning instrumentally, as a strategic resource, rather than as a constitutive dimension shaping the horizons of possible action (Vahabzadeh, 2003). This neglect produces a blind spot regarding how fracture transforms from an individual condition into a shared horizon of collective possibility (Carlisle, 2017).

Vahabzadeh's radical phenomenology offers a critical resource for addressing this theoretical gap through a systematic critique of "ultimate referentiality," the assumption that theoretical postulates can be secured by mooring them in a presumed locus in the "real," namely, "society" as a foundational concept (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 451). Vahabzadeh argues that sociology has historically posited a fully rational domain in the "real," a certain conception of society whose truth can be revealed only if our theories and methods are equally rational (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 453). The concept of "ultimate referentiality" thus functions as the point of moorage that supposedly secures theoretical postulates, but it simultaneously closes down the very possibilities that social movements open up (Vahabzadeh, 2009). By reexamining the foundations of everyday acting and thinking and stepping into the open expanse of a possible transition to a postmodern era, Vahabzadeh (2003) presents a theory of acting that refuses to surrender to norms and legislation and thus intimates a mode of thinking that challenges various manifestations of ultimacy.

This critique of foundationalism has significant implications for analyzing Islamic thinkers' conceptualizations of social movements. Many readings within contemporary Islamic thought remain entangled with forms of foundationalism that posit final referents (scriptural, jurisprudential, or metaphysical) as fixed criteria for judging social action and collective identity.

Kuntowijoyo's transcendental structuralism, for instance, presupposes divine revelation as the foundational ground for social analysis, grounding its framework in theocentrism (Khasri & Mustansyir, 2020).

Conversely, Hanafi applied Husserl's phenomenology to Islamic theology, shifting it from a theocentric, dogmatic framework toward an anthropocentric, liberation-oriented one (Prihantoro, 2023). His project *Min al-'Aqidah ila al-Thawrah* connects faith with revolutionary praxis, understanding religious experience as a lived social phenomenon (Prihantoro, 2023). Influenced by Iqbal's modernism, Hanafi focused on applying existential phenomenology to Muslim societies (Wijaya & Hidayat, 2024). However, even his project may not fully escape "ultimate referentiality," as it ultimately grounds itself in theology.

This study addresses the theoretical gap by examining cultural rearticulation in contemporary social movements through radical phenomenology, focusing on the critique of "ultimate referentiality" in Islamic thinkers' readings. It asks: How do fractured lifeworlds, through the critique of foundational assumptions, become sites of creative reconfiguration and horizon-opening in contemporary social movements? The study's significance lies in bridging phenomenological social theory and social movement studies through Vahabzadeh's radical phenomenology, offering a critical dialogue with Islamic thinkers that moves beyond foundationalist readings toward a phenomenologically grounded understanding of collective action in contexts of systemic fracture.

## Theoretical Framework

### Lifeworld, Intersubjectivity, and Experience

The phenomenological tradition provides the foundational vocabulary for understanding social movements as emerging from lived experience rather than structural determination. Husserl's lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) designates the prereflective horizon of everyday life underlying all constructions (Husserl, 1954/1970): a historically sedimented field of meaning constituted through collective practices (Husserl, 1954/1970; Steinbock, 1995). The lifeworld is both constituted by cultural expectations and constitutive of perception, action, and judgment; this duality becomes visible when assumptions are disrupted through surprise or crisis (Reynaert, 2024). As Moran (2012) observes, Husserl's account of renewal addresses the paradox that humans are both natural objects and "subjects for the world" (Husserl, 1954/1970; Moran, 2012). Schutz (1967) extended this account into sociological methodology, showing that the lifeworld is a social world constituted through "we-relations" and the social distribution of knowledge, thereby providing a link between phenomenological philosophy and empirical sociology (Sun, 2013). Building on this, Vahabzadeh (2003) develops a radical phenomenology that reworks the concept of experience, presenting a theory of acting that refuses to surrender to norms and challenges ultimacy through "articulated experiences" and *Urstiftung* (original founding). The event bursts open the horizon, making the unforeseeable and singular possible, upending its context, and reconfiguring the world (Gasché, 2005; Raffoul, 2023; Vahabzadeh, 2003).

### Ultimate Referentiality in Sociological Theory

A central contribution of Vahabzadeh's (2003, 2009) project is its systematic critique of "ultimate referentiality," the assumption that theoretical postulates can be secured by mooring them in "society" as both a foundational reality and a concept. Sociology has historically operated on this assumption, requiring stability in its central concept despite society's ever-changing character (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 451). Drawing on radical phenomenology, Vahabzadeh (2009) draws attention to ultimate referentiality as a point of moorage that purportedly secures theoretical postulates yet simultaneously closes down possibilities that social movements open up (Murphy, 2005; Vahabzadeh, 2003, 2009). His approach presents a theory of acting that refuses to surrender to norms and challenges ultimacy (Vahabzadeh, 2003). This critique has significant implications for analyzing how contemporary Islamic thinkers conceptualize social movements, as many remain entangled with forms of foundationalism that posit final referents—scriptural, jurisprudential, or metaphysical—as fixed criteria for judging social action and collective identity. Sallis (1995) characterizes the end of metaphysics as a horizon that both encloses thought and opens it to what lies beyond; similarly, the critique of ultimate referentiality seeks to open social theory beyond closed metaphysical assumptions.

### Structuralist Approaches in Contemporary Islamic Social Thought

Kuntowijoyo's "transcendental structuralism" synthesizes structuralist method with Islamic theology, applying Qur'anic teachings to social transformation (Fahmi, 2004; Khasri & Mustansyir, 2020). His framework presupposes the transcendence of the subject in society, driven by divine values moving toward concrete stages, while maintaining the principle of wholeness (Khasri & Mustansyir, 2020). Part of a broader movement of contemporary Muslim thinkers responding to sociohistorical changes (Fahmi, 2004), his approach is built on "prophetic ethics"—humanization, liberation, and transcendence—as the foundation for integrating science and religion (Kuntowijoyo, 2006; Zulkarnain & Mustafa, 2019).

### The Phenomenological Turn in Islamic Thought

Hassan Hanafi engages phenomenology to reconstruct Islamic theology as a theology of liberation, applying Husserl's method to shift from a theocentric framework toward an anthropocentric, liberation-oriented one (Prihantoro, 2023). His *Min al-'Aqidah ila al-Thawrah* connects faith with revolutionary praxis (Hanafi, 1966). However, he may ultimately remain grounded in theocentrism, occupying the margins of traditionalism (Prihantoro, 2023, p. 146). Influenced by Iqbal's modernism, he applied existential phenomenology to Muslim societies (Kuntowijoyo's Influences, 2024). Though it may not fully escape "ultimate referentiality," his treatment of belief as a lived experiential reality provides resources for a phenomenologically grounded sociology of social movements (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025).

### New Social Movements, Identity, and Collective Action

Vahabzadeh (2003) offers a framework for understanding identity formation and collective action, arguing that articulated experiences provide content for identities and enable social

imaginaries. Movement actors acquire identity through a destinal path toward a social imaginary, with genuine articulation setting forth a nonhegemonic, transgressive destiny that defies hegemonic limitations (Vahabzadeh, 2003). According to this theory, within the intersubjective lifeworld, experience is normally constructed according to the hegemonic principles that tacitly, implicitly, and effectively govern the social imaginary and lifeworld. As such, hegemonized experiences permeate subjects' self-understanding and horizons of possibility. As embodiments of new social imaginaries that challenge the status quo to varying degrees, social movements may represent actors distancing themselves from a hegemonized lifeworld and refusing to be confined within categories defined by hegemonic principles. The challenge for new social movements is to free practices from the "oppressive categorization of actors" by technological liberalism (Vahabzadeh, 2003). This resonates with Melucci's (1996) theory of collective identity, which examines social change and systems of action to formulate an account of collective identity, emphasizing meaning-making processes that enable collective action. Identity in contemporary movements is shaped by experiential hegemonies and *Urstiftung* (original founding), in which founding moments establish new horizons of meaning (Vahabzadeh, 2003).

## Toward a Phenomenological Sociology of Social Movements in Islamic Contexts

This framework integrates three strands: (1) the phenomenological tradition from Husserl through Schutz to Vahabzadeh, which establishes the lifeworld as foundational for understanding collective action arising from disrupted meanings (Husserl, 1954/1970; Schutz, 1967; Vahabzadeh, 2003); (2) Vahabzadeh's critique of "ultimate referentiality" as a lens for examining foundational assumptions in sociological theory and Islamic thought (Vahabzadeh, 2003, 2009); and (3) engagement with Islamic thinkers—Kuntowijoyo's structuralist approach and Hanafi's phenomenological approach—to demonstrate how these debates unfold within Islamic intellectual traditions (Fahmi, 2004; Hanafi, 1966; Khasri & Mustansyir, 2020; Prihantoro, 2023). This framework enables an examination of foundationalist assumptions that foreclose "evental" and "horizon-opening" dimensions (Gasché, 2005; Vahabzadeh, 2003). It also provides resources for attending to lived experiences as sites of meaning-making (Schutz, 1967; Vahabzadeh, 2003) and establishes a vocabulary—"event," "opening of horizons," and "articulated experience"—for theorizing movements as disrupting sedimented meanings while gesturing toward new possibilities (Raffoul, 2010; Vahabzadeh, 2003).

## Contextualizing Kuntowijoyo and Hanafi: Indonesia and Egypt

The comparison between Kuntowijoyo and Hanafi must be situated within their distinct historical and political contexts. Kuntowijoyo developed his "prophetic social science" in postcolonial Indonesia, where a central challenge was to construct an indigenous Islamic social science capable of integrating revelation with modern knowledge (Fahmi, 2004; Khasri & Mustansyir, 2020). In contrast, Hassan Hanafi formulated his "actual theology" in Egypt amid the political crises following the 1967 defeat, where a central challenge was to reconstruct traditional theology in response to occupation, class inequalities, and political oppression, giving his project a distinctly revolutionary and liberation-oriented character (Hanafi, 1988; Prihantoro, 2023).

Indonesia's experience with democratic elections in 1955 provided a precedent for consensus-building and gradual social transformation, whereas Egypt's post-1952 military rule and the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict created conditions in which revolutionary discourse and the "Islamic Left" paradigm gained urgency. These contrasting contexts—one knowledge-focused (epistemological) and the other liberation-focused (political and social)—help explain the divergent emphases of their approaches. Kuntowijoyo prioritizes the development of a "prophetic social science" through transcendental structuralism to analyze and transform Muslim societies from within (Kuntowijoyo, 2006; Zulkarnain & Mustafa, 2019), while Hanafi prioritizes the development of an "actual theology" that connects creed to revolution, addressing marginalization and class inequalities through his "Islamic Left" paradigm (Tavassoli & Mowahedi, 2025). Acknowledging these contextual differences enriches rather than undermines the comparative analysis, as it reveals how both thinkers, despite their different contexts, respond to the challenges of their respective lifeworlds through distinct but comparable theoretical frameworks (Husserl, 1954/1970; Schutz, 1967).

## Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative approach with a descriptive–analytical design, employing documentary and conceptual analysis (Creswell & Poth, 2018). This approach suits the interpretive nature of the research, which examines how Islamic thinkers conceptualize social movements and their relation to foundational assumptions (Vahabzadeh, 2003, 2009).

Data collection involved documentary analysis of primary sources: Vahabzadeh's *Articulated Experiences* (2003) and his article on ultimate referentiality (2009); Kuntowijoyo's *Islam Sebagai Ilmu* (2006); and Hanafi's *Min al-'Aqidah ila al-Thawrah* (1966). Secondary sources examining these thinkers (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025; Fahmi, 2004; Khasri & Mustansyir, 2020; Prihantoro, 2023; Tavassoli & Mowahedi, 2025) and empirical studies (Hanafiah, 2018; Yulianto et al., 2026) were also included. Documents were selected based on relevance, scholarly quality, accessibility, chronological scope, and thematic focus.

Data analysis proceeded in four phases: (1) identification of key concepts—lifeworld, ultimate referentiality, event, horizon-opening, structuralism, and phenomenology (Husserl, 1954/1970; Schutz, 1967; Vahabzadeh, 2003, 2009); (2) comparative analysis of Kuntowijoyo's structuralist and Hanafi's phenomenological approaches; (3) application of Vahabzadeh's critique of ultimate referentiality to examine foundationalist assumptions (Reynaert, 2024; Vahabzadeh, 2003); and (4) integration of findings into a synthetic framework drawing on Vahabzadeh's "articulated experiences" and "sociology of possibilities."

Trustworthiness was addressed through prolonged textual immersion, thick description, hermeneutic self-awareness, and conclusions grounded in the analyzed texts. Ethical considerations focused on proper attribution and balanced representation. Limitations include exclusive reliance on texts and a focus on a limited number of thinkers. Despite these limitations, the methodology provides a framework for examining the dialogue between structuralist and phenomenological approaches in Islamic thought.

# Findings

## Conceptual Identification and Definition

The first step involves the systematic identification and definition of the core concepts that structure this inquiry. Three foundational concepts emerge from the analysis of the primary sources: "ultimate referentiality" as formulated by Vahabzadeh, the "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*) as developed within the phenomenological tradition, and the "event" as a radical rupture in existing orders of meaning.

Ultimate referentiality is a concept central to Vahabzadeh's critique of foundationalism in sociology. A brief and selective glance at the history of sociological foundations shows that a certain assumption about the "ultimate referentiality" of society has been at the heart of sociology (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 447). Vahabzadeh defines this concept as the point of moorage that supposedly secures theoretical postulates in a presumed locus in the "real," namely, "society" (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 447). Sociological theory has assumed that "society" is external to, and unaffected by, sociological theorizing, while "society" as a concrete reality is inevitably conceptualized by sociological theory in such a way that it conforms to the foundational epistemologies of social theory. As such, theory always appeals to "society" as its "real" referent and has been unwavering in presupposing this referent as an ultimacy; hence the term "ultimate referentiality." This metaphysical mode of thinking requires stability in the original central concept. Yet, given that "society" is ever-changing, the quest for a foundation upon which sociological research can be based remains contentious (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 453). Drawing on radical phenomenology and postmetaphysical hermeneutical philosophy, Vahabzadeh draws attention to ultimate referentiality as a fundamental problem and invites an interpretative renewal of sociology with an acute sensitivity to praxis (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 447).

The critique of ultimate referentiality does not condemn every framework with a fixed point; rather, it examines how foundational assumptions function epistemologically and whether they foreclose or enable openness to new possibilities and horizon-opening dimensions of collective action (Vahabzadeh, 2003, 2009). In other words, it offers an acute epistemic awareness that cautions against any referential point or object that theory treats as given without justification, or as beyond the scope of theoretical criticism. This conceptual stance, in turn, yields a methodological stance: not an ideological presupposition but a reflexive analytical lens that continuously re-examines its own assumptions. It recognizes that every theoretical framework necessarily operates with some form of referentiality while investigating how that referentiality shapes the horizons of theoretical possibility.

The concept of the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) provides the phenomenological gateway for understanding the terrain from which social movements emerge. First presented by Husserl as the unproblematic, self-evident background of human action, the concept was later developed by Alfred Schutz, who defined it as the natural environment of everyday life, based on natural attitudes that motivate action in temporal, spatial, and social contexts (Schutz, 1967, as discussed in Ho, 2008). According to Schutz, the lifeworld captures the "world of daily life," entailing "knowledge

at hand" and a "stock of experiences": a world lived in the "natural attitude" (Schutz, 1970, p. 72), in which the subject perceives the surrounding environment (*Umwelt*) in a passive, uncritical, and matter-of-fact way. The lifeworld is both constituted by sedimented cultural expectations and constitutive of perception, action, and judgment, a duality that becomes visible when assumptions are disrupted through surprise, anomaly, or collective crisis. Research has identified three influential usages: Schutz's emphasis on subjective constructions, Habermas's focus on intersubjective communication, and Husserl's exposition of the world of self-evidence that underlies them (Kobayashi, 1989, p. 406). In this study, the concept of the lifeworld enables an understanding of how social movements arise from the rupture of taken-for-granted meanings that had previously rendered the world natural and uncontested. As Ho (2008) points out, lived experience (*Erlebnis*) is founded on the non-discursivity of the lifeworld, the pre-predicative background of expectations from which the discursive arises.

The "event" emerges as the third central concept, signifying a radical rupture in existing orders of meaning that opens new horizons for collective action. Vahabzadeh characterizes the event as a moment of rupture that disrupts hegemonic arrangements of meaning and opens unprecedented possibilities (Vahabzadeh, 2009). The event is not merely a political occurrence but a phenomenon that bursts open the horizon, making possible the unforeseeable and the singular. In his analysis of the 1960s as a "world-historical" age of movements, Vahabzadeh observes that global events of this period were related to one another, revealing the "international connection between social movements" (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 13) and marking the birth of "new social movements" and identity politics (Vahabzadeh, 2003). His radical phenomenology reinvigorates the Husserlian concept of *Urstiftung* (original founding or primal establishment) to understand how identities and social movements undergo epochal transformations through "articulated experiences" that simultaneously stabilize and disrupt meanings beyond the predominant chains of signification sanctioned by hegemonic constructs (Vahabzadeh, 2003).

The relationship among these three concepts is dialectical: the lifeworld represents the taken-for-granted horizon of meaning (even in the realm of science, as Husserl recognized) that ultimate referentiality seeks to secure as a foundation in many sociological approaches to social movements, while the event ruptures both the lifeworld's taken-for-grantedness and the foundational claims of ultimate referentiality, opening new possibilities for collective action. This conceptual triad establishes the analytical framework for understanding how Islamic thinkers' readings of social movements may remain entangled with foundationalist assumptions and how the radical phenomenology of the event can open horizons foreclosed by these assumptions.

## Kuntowijoyo's Transcendental Structuralism

The second methodological step involves a systematic comparative analysis of Kuntowijoyo's structuralist approach and Hassan Hanafi's phenomenological approach, examining their conceptualizations of social movements, agency versus structure, social transformation, and lived experience versus systemic analysis.

Kuntowijoyo's "transcendental structuralism" offers a distinctive synthesis of structuralist methodology and Islamic theological commitments. In his work *Islam as Knowledge: Epistemology, Methodology, and Ethics* (2006), he constructs a social theory rooted in Islamic tradition while maintaining analytical rigor. The framework is built around "prophetic ethics," comprising humanization, liberation, and transcendence, which serve as the epistemological and axiological foundation for social transformation (Kuntowijoyo, 2006; Zulkarnain & Mustafa, 2019).

Khasri and Mustansyir (2020, p. 136) explain that Kuntowijoyo's transformative thinking presupposes the transcendence of the subject in an abstract form, namely, society or people. This abstraction is pursued through a unified understanding grounded in collective historical awareness, in which the consciousness of each subject enters into dialogue with that of others, recognizes their existence, and, most importantly, recognizes a historical direction driven by the transcendental dimension of divine (monotheistic) value as it moves toward the most concrete stages. In the final stage of "muammalah transcendental structuralism," Kuntowijoyo leads readers toward an understanding of how the concretization of monotheism fosters awareness at the level of society as a whole (Khasri & Mustansyir, 2020). The authors note that Kuntowijoyo retains the structuralist principle of wholeness, although he does not consistently apply all the principles of structuralism.

Drawing on Piaget's structuralism, Kuntowijoyo conceives of structure as possessing three characteristics: wholeness (*kulliyyah*), transformability (*tahawwul*), and self-regulation (*tandhim al-dhati*). Islam, in this framework, is understood as a "totality" within which its elements (prayer, alms, fasting, and pilgrimage) acquire meaning as part of a unified and comprehensive structure. This approach enables the application of Islamic social teachings to contemporary conditions while maintaining coherence with the Islamic tradition. Kuntowijoyo (2006, pp. 51–53) explains:

Structure has three characteristics: wholeness, transformation, and self-regulation. Islam as a whole has elements such as prayer, zakat, and fasting. Each element has its own laws. However, in Islam, there is a concept of a comprehensive Islam, but it cannot be reduced to individual elements of Islam. Someone who diligently performs prayer, pays zakat in full, and fasts properly does not necessarily have a perfect Islam. Perfecting the individual elements of Islam does not guarantee that a person has become a complete Muslim.

Kuntowijoyo's prophetic social science (*Ilmu Sosial Profetik*) is grounded in three interconnected pillars derived from Qur'anic ethics, particularly Qur'an 3:110 (Sūrat Āl ʿImrān), which describes the Muslim community as "the best community," enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God (Fahmi, 2004; Kuntowijoyo, 2006). These pillars are:

- **Humanization (*Humanisasi*):** This dimension emphasizes the restoration of human dignity and the critique of dehumanizing social structures. Kuntowijoyo argues that social science must move beyond mere description to participate actively in humanizing society. This prophetic dimension is inspired by Muhammad Iqbal's concept of prophetic ethics, which Kuntowijoyo integrated into his theoretical framework. Iqbal's influence is evident

in Kuntowijoyo's emphasis on theological reconstruction as a basis for social transformation. Kuntowijoyo emphasizes this point:

> *"Humanization is necessary because society is in three acute conditions, namely dehumanization (technological, economic, cultural and state objectification), aggressiveness (collective aggressiveness and criminality) and loneliness (privatization, individuation)"*

- **Liberation (*Liberasi*):** This dimension draws on the spirit of liberation theology but is reformulated within an Islamic social-scientific framework rather than a purely theological one (Fahmi, 2004). Kuntowijoyo's engagement with liberation discourse emerged partly through his interaction with Moeslim Abdurrahman's ideas of "transformative theology," which developed in the late 1980s as a critical reflection on modernization and its unequal benefits (Kuntowijoyo, 2001, pp. 106–107). Rather than adopting a purely theological approach, Kuntowijoyo translated this concern into social-scientific terms, creating analytical tools for examining oppression and inequality.
- **Transcendence (*Transendensi*):** This dimension provides the normative direction for social transformation, ensuring that humanization and liberation are oriented toward divine values. Transcendence serves as the guiding principle that prevents the other two dimensions from becoming purely secular or ideological projects. As Fahmi (2004) explains, transcendence becomes "the guide for direction and purpose for which the two previous elements (humanization and liberation) move."

Kuntowijoyo's theory of social transformation emphasizes the centrality of historical consciousness. He divides the religious consciousness of Muslims into three historical periods: the mythological period, the ideological period, and the scientific period (Fahmi, 2004). His analysis of social transformation in Madura exemplifies this approach, examining how economic dynamics influenced religious, social, and cultural change in a society considered part of Javanese civilization.

Khasri and Mustansyir (2020, p. 136) emphasize that the subject has a central role in social transformation, which can be achieved following intellectual transformation. This emphasis on intellectual transformation departs from the structuralist tendency to reduce the role of the subject. The involvement of "historical consciousness" in Kuntowijoyo's work represents a significant contribution to his transformative thinking.

Kuntowijoyo identifies three traditions of knowledge in the Islamic world: normative knowledge (focused on *da'wah*), ideological knowledge (focused on politics), and scientific knowledge (focused on objective inquiry). He criticizes all three for becoming "normal science" in the Kuhnian sense, maintaining the status quo and failing to create new paradigms (Kuntowijoyo, 2001, pp. 103–106). The new paradigm should have a new commitment to the *ummah* (society, communities, peoples, tribes, and nation).

While Kuntowijoyo critically employs Western social science, he appreciates the empirical methods of Western social scientists such as Snouck Hurgronje, Schrieke, Pijper, and Clifford

Geertz, acknowledging that "their empirical methods are praiseworthy" (Kuntowijoyo, 2001, pp. 103–105). This balanced engagement with Western scholarship distinguishes Kuntowijoyo's approach from purely apologetic or rejectionist stances.

**Hassan Hanafi's Phenomenological Theology**

Hassan Hanafi's project represents a significant alternative to structuralist approaches, employing a phenomenological method to reconstruct Islamic theology as a project of liberation. His five-volume *Min al-'Aqidah ila al-Thawrah* (*From Creed to Revolution*), published in 1988, attempts to connect faith with revolutionary praxis, using phenomenology as a methodological tool for understanding religious experience as a lived, social phenomenon (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025; Hanafi, 1988; Prihantoro, 2023).

In the framework of Hanafi's thought, theology appears to shift from a discourse rooted in theocentrism toward an anthropocentric dimension. However, the term "Hanafi anthropocentrism" requires clarification, as Hanafi ultimately grounds his theology in theocentrism (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025). Within a traditional framework, Hanafi occupies the margins of traditionalism, emphasizing human liberation as a pathway through which humanity may ultimately reach God.

Research on Hanafi's "actual theology" suggests that he reconstructs Islamic theology by shifting its epistemological axis from a purely theocentric-dogmatic orientation toward a theological anthropocentrism focused on justice, liberation, and historical agency (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025). This transformation is not a simple rejection of theocentrism but a reorientation that emphasizes the human dimension of theological understanding while maintaining an ultimate commitment to the divine. A central question in this research is how Hanafi's reconstruction of Islamic theology generates a liberating paradigm capable of linking faith (*al-'aqidah*) with revolution (*al-thawrah*) in contemporary Islamic discourse (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025).

Hanafi employs the Husserlian concept of *epoché* (bracketing) to suspend the metaphysical assumptions of traditional theology. This methodological move is intended to enable a fresh engagement with religious experience that bypasses the accumulated dogmatic frameworks of traditional theology. However, Tavassoli and Mowahedi (2025) argue that Hanafi does not maintain an impartial suspension in practice and instead substitutes Marxist assumptions, reducing phenomenology to an "ideological hermeneutics."

This approach, while contributing to the social dynamism of religion and redefining the declaration "There is no god but Allah" through a dialectic of negation and affirmation, carries the risk of reducing the transcendent dimension of religion to a purely worldly ideology (Tavassoli & Mowahedi, 2025). The tension between Hanafi's phenomenological aspirations and his ideological commitments is thus an important internal tension in his project.

Taufiqurrahman (2023) argues that Hanafi's interpretive approach combines *usul al-fiqh*, phenomenology, Marxism, and hermeneutics, positioning humans as active subjects in interpreting revelation. While this synthesis is innovative, it may also risk reducing religion to worldly ideology (Tavassoli & Mowahedi, 2025).

Hanafi's project is framed within the broader context of the "Islamic Left" (*al-Yasar al-Islami*), which positions itself as an alternative to both traditionalist Islam and Western-dominated modernity. Central to this project is Hanafi's critique of Western hegemony as operating not merely through material exploitation but through consciousness itself. Eastern societies, Hanafi argues, have long been objectified by the West, resulting in an entrenched inferiority complex: the internalization of the assumption that the West is inherently superior and the East inherently inferior.

Kazuo Shimogaki criticizes Hanafi's Islamic Left as overly one-sided in its treatment of the West. However, this critique can also be considered in light of what Hannah Arendt calls the perspective of the "object" or "victim," as a possible corrective to hegemonic discourse. Shimogaki nonetheless regards Hanafi's theological vision as one of the foundations for a robust religious movement.

Hanafi articulates the urgency of theological reconstruction in terms of the concrete realities of Muslim life:

> *"If the science of Usul al-Din is fundamentally reconstructed in accordance with the demands of the times, as it was established by predecessors to address the challenges of their era, it will constitute a theology that responds to the realities of Muslim life, including foreign occupation, backwardness, oppression, poverty, alienation, division, and indifference, as well as the values of liberation, progress, and revival. Many Muslim homelands have been colonized, particularly Palestine. Their natural resources have been exploited by imperialist powers from outside Islam and by dictatorial rulers within the Muslim world itself" (Hanafi, 1988).*

Despite his revolutionary aspirations, Hanafi's theological scheme has also been characterized as retaining traditional foundations, a pattern described as "actual theology" (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025). Rather than simply shifting theology from theocentrism to anthropocentrism, Hanafi emphasizes a theological anthropocentrism that maintains theological foundations while foregrounding human liberation.

In Hanafi's view, the crisis of the Islamic world has two dimensions: one originating outside the Islamic world and the other from within it. While solutions must be formulated for external challenges, internal problems also demand resolution. For this reason, Hanafi grounds his thought in theological foundations, arguing that addressing these foundations is necessary to resolve the conflicts and ambiguities.

### The Critique of Ultimate Referentiality

The third step applies Vahabzadeh's critique of "ultimate referentiality" to examine how each thinker's framework may remain entangled with foundationalist assumptions that foreclose the

"evental" and "horizon-opening" dimensions of social movements. This analysis draws on close readings of the primary texts of Kuntowijoyo and Hanafi.

**Ultimate Referentiality in Kuntowijoyo's Transcendental Structuralism**

Kuntowijoyo's transcendental structuralism, as articulated in *Islam Sebagai Ilmu* (2006) and analyzed by Khasri and Mustansyir (2020), reveals a potential entanglement with ultimate referentiality in several distinct forms.

Kuntowijoyo's framework is built on the premise that divine revelation (the Qur'an and Sunnah) serves as a foundational reference for social analysis. As Khasri and Mustansyir (2020) explain, Kuntowijoyo's transformative thinking presupposes the transcendence of the subject in an abstract form, namely, society or people, driven by the transcendental dimension of divine (monotheistic) value as it moves toward the most concrete stages. The concretization of monotheism leads to awareness at the level of society as a whole. From the perspective adopted here, the question is whether revelation also functions as an ultimate referentiality that constrains the analysis of emergent social possibilities.

This reliance on divine revelation is evident in Kuntowijoyo's methodological framework. In his "prophetic social science," the methodologies of integration and objectification are grounded in revelation as a primary source of truth. Kuntowijoyo argues that secular knowledge is the product of all human beings, while "integral science" is the joint product of believers. However, even in his effort to develop Islamic thought, Kuntowijoyo does not negate the established role of secular sciences. He states that internalization in the prophetic Islamic paradigm does not seek to Islamize objective secular sciences because the spirit of Islam itself is the objectivity of science. Nevertheless, revelation retains a foundational role.

Kuntowijoyo's prophetic ethics, comprising humanization, liberation, and transcendence, serve as the epistemological and axiological foundation for social transformation. As Zulkarnain and Mustafa (2019) explain, these values underpin Kuntowijoyo's approach to integrating science and religion. Because they are themselves grounded in divine revelation, they also prompt a question about whether revelation functions as a referential point beyond the framework's own critical scrutiny. Kuntowijoyo presents prophetic social transformation as proceeding from faith, understood initially in abstract terms, toward social praxis. The concretization of faith involves a dialectic of revelation and reason, but revelation retains its foundational status.

Kuntowijoyo's commitment to the structuralist principle of "wholeness" (*kulliyyah*) may constitute another form of ultimate referentiality. Khasri and Mustansyir (2020) note that Kuntowijoyo retains this principle, although he does not consistently apply all the principles of structuralism. Islam, in this framework, is understood as a "totality" within which its elements acquire meaning as part of a unified and comprehensive structure. If this totality is treated as fixed, the framework may constrain recognition of the "evental" dimensions of social movements: movements might be interpreted primarily as expressions of an existing whole rather than as ruptures capable of challenging or transforming it.

Kuntowijoyo's account of the world's ontological status raises a related question. According to Khasri and Mustansyir (2020), the distinction between this world and the hereafter is central to his understanding of revelation. Human subjects seek to accommodate this distinction through self-transcendence. The world, understood in relation to both the present and the hereafter, thus provides a framework for social analysis. In this account, the objective world is understood not only through sensory experience but also through reflection on its continuity with the metaphysical realm, as expressed in Islamic teachings concerning heaven and hell and the mortal and the immortal. Whether this ontological framework operates as an ultimate referentiality, rather than as a theological commitment open to interpretation, requires further examination.

**Ultimate Referentiality in Hassan Hanafi's Phenomenological Theology**

Despite his use of phenomenological method, Hassan Hanafi's theology may retain forms of ultimate referentiality that limit its capacity to theorize the "evental" dimensions of social movements.

Research on Hanafi's "actual theology" (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025) suggests that his thought shifts theology from a theocentric discourse toward an anthropocentric dimension. However, the term "Hanafi anthropocentrism" requires clarification because Hanafi continues to ground his theology in a commitment to the divine. Within a traditional theological framework, he emphasizes human liberation as a pathway through which humanity may ultimately reach God. This creates a tension between the human-centered orientation of his project and its enduring theological commitments. The present analysis asks whether these commitments function as an ultimate referentiality that limits the role of human experience.

This tension is evident in Hanafi's project *Min al-'Aqidah ila al-Thawrah* (*From Creed to Revolution*). The question of how theological reconstruction can link faith (*al-'aqidah*) with revolution (*al-thawrah*) begins from faith as a foundational commitment (Firdaus & Pauji, 2025; Hanafi, 1988). Although Hanafi directs theology toward liberation, the relationship between creed and revolutionary praxis remains central to his framework. Whether creed functions as an unquestioned foundation or is itself transformed through praxis is therefore a question for the present critique.

Firdaus and Pauji (2025) characterize Hanafi's theological project as retaining traditional foundations despite its revolutionary aspirations, describing this pattern as "actual theology." Rather than simply replacing theocentrism with anthropocentrism, Hanafi develops a theological anthropocentrism that maintains theological commitments while foregrounding human liberation. The persistence of these commitments is significant for an analysis of ultimate referentiality, although their presence alone does not establish that they foreclose new possibilities.

Hanafi grounds his thought in theological foundations, arguing that addressing them is necessary to resolve the conflicts and ambiguities facing the Islamic world. From the perspective of Vahabzadeh's critique, the question is whether treating these foundations as prior to collective experience limits the framework's ability to recognize events that challenge or transform established theological interpretations.

Sediqi et al. (2024) examine Hanafi's interpretation of *tawḥīd* (monotheism), identifying a tension between its theological and social dimensions. According to their analysis, Hanafi shifts emphasis from affirming divine unity as a theological doctrine toward understanding *tawḥīd* as a practical orientation to human freedom and social justice. They argue that, although this interpretation highlights the social significance of monotheism, it risks reducing God to a projection of human needs and weakening the recognition of God's independent reality. Their criticism thus concerns Hanafi's account of *tawḥīd*, not his account of resurrection.

Read through the critique of ultimate referentiality developed in this article, Hanafi's practical interpretation of *tawḥīd* may be seen as an attempt to move beyond treating theological doctrine as a fixed point of reference for social action. At the same time, if human needs or historical praxis become the unquestioned ground of theological interpretation, the framework risks replacing one form of ultimate referentiality with another.

Tavassoli and Mowahedi (2025) identify a methodological difficulty in Hanafi's use of phenomenology. They argue that, although Hanafi employs Husserl's *epoché* to suspend the metaphysical assumptions of traditional theology, he does not maintain an impartial suspension in practice. Instead, they contend, Marxist assumptions shape his interpretation, turning phenomenology into what they describe as an "ideological hermeneutics." On their reading, this approach contributes to the social dynamism of religion but risks reducing its transcendent dimension to a worldly ideology.

Viewed through Vahabzadeh's critique, this difficulty raises the possibility that Marxist assumptions become a new ultimate referentiality in Hanafi's interpretation of theology and phenomenology. If so, the substitution of one unquestioned foundation for another would not overcome the epistemological problem identified by the critique of ultimate referentiality.

## The Consequences of Ultimate Referentiality for Theorizing Social Movements

Despite their different approaches, Kuntowijoyo's and Hanafi's frameworks may constrain recognition of the "evental" dimensions of social movements when their foundational commitments are treated as ultimate referentialities. The "event," in Vahabzadeh's sense, signifies a radical rupture in existing orders of meaning that opens new horizons for collective action and cannot be fully reduced to predetermined patterns or frameworks.

Kuntowijoyo's structuralism, with its emphasis on wholeness and revelation, may lead social movements to be interpreted primarily as expressions of prophetic ethics. Such an interpretation risks overlooking movements as generative ruptures that challenge or transform existing understandings of Islamic teachings. If wholeness is treated as a closed totality, it becomes difficult to account for a movement that introduces a genuinely novel element.

Hanafi's theology, despite its revolutionary aspirations, may face a similar difficulty insofar as its theological foundations are treated as fixed. His historical interpretation of resurrection emphasizes the social significance of doctrine, yet the relation between theological commitments and historical praxis remains open to question. If either is taken as an unquestioned ground, the

framework may struggle to recognize movements that challenge established theological interpretations or open unforeseen possibilities.

The issue, then, is not whether these frameworks have foundations, but whether those foundations foreclose the "horizon-opening" possibilities that Vahabzadeh identifies in social movements. In Kuntowijoyo's framework, prophetic ethics and wholeness may orient interpretations of collective action without necessarily predetermining its future. Similarly, Hanafi's theological commitments may provide a direction for liberation without necessarily fixing its outcomes. Their capacity to account for novelty depends on how these commitments operate in the analysis of particular movements.

Vahabzadeh's "sociology of possibilities" offers a way to examine this question. By redirecting inquiry from "what is" to "what could be," it enables an account of social movements as events that disrupt established meanings and open possibilities not fully contained within existing theoretical frameworks (Vahabzadeh, 2003, 2009).

To illustrate the analytical capacity of this framework, consider a social movement in a Muslim-majority context where religious authority is institutionalized within state structures. A structural analysis would examine the institutional conditions that shape dissent; a phenomenological analysis would consider how everyday practices become sites of contestation; and, following Vahabzadeh (2003), an evental analysis would ask whether collective action opens previously unforeseen possibilities. This illustration suggests three lines of inquiry: how structural inequalities and lived experiences are articulated collectively; how that articulation may reshape the field of possible action; and whether a movement's challenge to established assumptions reveals the contingency of referential points previously treated as fixed (Vahabzadeh, 2009).

## Conclusion

Kuntowijoyo's transcendental structuralism, with its emphasis on wholeness, transformation, and self-regulation, provides tools for mapping the structural contexts in which social movements emerge. Rather than treating these structures as ultimate referentialities that determine social action, the synthetic framework proposed here treats them as historically situated conditions that shape, but do not exhaust, the possibilities for action.

This reinterpretation draws on Kuntowijoyo's acknowledgment of structural transformation. As Fahmi (2004) notes, Kuntowijoyo's analysis of social transformation in Madura examines how economic dynamics influenced religious, social, and cultural change. The structural context is thus not static but changes through the interplay of multiple forces. The synthetic framework extends this insight by asking how events might generate possibilities that cannot be fully explained by existing structures. Hanafi's phenomenological theology, in turn, offers resources for examining how participants experience social movements and how collective action transforms their understanding of faith and social life. His theological anthropocentrism, while retaining a theocentric orientation, places human agency at the center of social transformation.

The lifeworld, as the taken-for-granted horizon of everyday experience, is a terrain on which meanings are constituted and contested. Social movements may emerge when familiar meanings

and practices are disrupted and new possibilities become visible. The synthetic framework therefore attends to how participants experience such disruptions and articulate new meanings through collective practice. An event is not merely a political occurrence. In the sense developed here, it disrupts established arrangements of meaning and opens possibilities not fully anticipated by existing frameworks. The evental dimension of a social movement cannot be reduced either to its structural context or to individual experience; it emerges through the interaction of structures, lived experience, and collective action.

Within this proposed framework, the Qur'an and Sunnah remain sources of guidance while also allowing space for interpretation in changing social circumstances. Kuntowijoyo's prophetic ethics, humanization, liberation, and transcendence, are retained as orientations for social action rather than treated as guarantees of predetermined outcomes. Humanization directs attention to human dignity; liberation concerns the expansion of possibilities for those who are oppressed; and transcendence orients action toward values beyond existing social arrangements.

The concept of the event, drawn from Vahabzadeh's radical phenomenology, can also be understood as a moment in which previously unseen possibilities become visible. This is a *disclosure* of possibilities, not revelation in the theological sense of divine communication. Keeping these meanings distinct allows the framework to connect attention to social transformation with Islamic thought without equating a social movement with divine revelation.

The synthetic framework also suggests a reconfiguration of the intellectual's role in Islamic social theory. Rather than serving solely as an interpreter of established principles, the intellectual may help articulate experiences of rupture and make emerging possibilities intelligible to others. This role does not require the intellectual to determine a movement's meaning or destination in advance. In practice, intellectuals may participate in this process by helping connect individual grievances with shared interpretations and forms of collective action. They may also attend to marginalized voices and question dominant accounts of a movement's aims. These are proposed implications of the framework, rather than findings established by the present study about intellectuals' roles in particular movements. On this account, the intellectual's contribution is to help keep interpretations of collective action open to meanings that emerge through the movement itself.

**Author Contributions:** All authors contributed equally to the conceptualization of the article and writing of the original and subsequent drafts.
**Funding:** This research received no external funding.
**Ethical Considerations:** The authors avoided data fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism, and any form of misconduct.
**Data Availability Statement:** Data available on request from the authors.
**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.
**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflicts of interest in this study.
**Declaration of AI Use:** The authors has used no AI tools.
**Acknowledgements:** The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions in manuscript revision.

## References


The Holy Qur'an.

Carlisle, E. (2017). On the possibilities of political action in-the-world: Pathways through Arendt, Castoriadis and Wagner. *Social Imaginaries, 3*(1), 83–117. https://doi.org/10.5840/si2017315

Fahmi, M. (2004). *Strukturalisme transendental: Upaya menerapkan ajaran Islam dalam transformasi sosial umat Islam di Indonesia*. UIN Sunan Kalijaga.

Firdaus, D., & Pauji, R. R. (2025). Hassan Hanafi's actual theology: From anthropocentrism to revolution. *Jurnal Adabiyah*, 25(2), 422–443. https://doi.org/10.24252/jad.v25i2a10

Gasché, R. (2005). Piercing the horizon. *Journal for Philosophy and Fine Arts*.

Hanafi, H. (1988). *Min al-'Aqidah ila al-Thawrah* (From Creed to Revolution). Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli. [In Arabic]

Husserl, E. (1970). *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology* (D. Carr, Trans.). Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1954)

Khasri, M. R. K., & Mustansyir, R. (2020). The role of subjects in Kuntowijoyo's transformative thought and it's relevance to the prophetical social transformation'. *SASDAYA: Gadjah Mada Journal of Humanities*, *4*(2), 126.

Kuntowijoyo, I. S. I. (2001). Muslim Tanpa Masjid: Esai-Esai Agama. *Budaya, Dan Politik Dalam Bingkai Strukturalisme Transendental (Bandung: Mizan, 2001)*.

Kuntowijoyo. (2006). *Islam sebagai ilmu: Epistemologi, metodologi, dan etika*. Tiara Wacana.

McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American journal of sociology*, *82*(6), 1212-1241.

Melucci, A. (1996). *Challenging codes: Collective action in the information age*. Cambridge University Press.

Moran, D. (2012). *Husserl's crisis of the European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction* (pp. 318-324). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murphy, D. J. (2005). The rhetoric of "unprincipled" philosophy. A critical notice of articulated experiences: Towards a radical phenomenology of contemporary social movements. *The European Legacy*, *10*(4), 389-395.

Prihantoro, H. A. (2023). Hassan Hanafi and Islamic Legal Theory From Phenomenology to Critique of the Slogan "Going Back to the Qur'an and Sunna". *Mazahib: Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam*, *20*(2), 192-223.

Raffoul, F. (2023). Event, as a Concept in Phenomenology. In *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (pp. 1-8). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Reynaert, D. (2024). Critical Theory: A Life-Worlds Approach. In N. Brando, D. Lawson and H. Stalford (eds.) *Children in Theory: Theoretical Methods and Approaches to the Study of Childhood*. Online Masterclass Series. University of Liverpool.

Sallis, J. (1995). *Delimitations: Phenomenology and the end of metaphysics* (2nd ed.). Indiana University Press.

Schutz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world. Northwestern University Press.

Schutz, A. (1970). *Of Phenomenology and Social Relations*. The Chicago University Press.

Sediqi, S.-S., Aghajani, N., & Mianji, N. (2024). A critical approach to Hasan Hanafi's materialist, phenomenological, and humanistic reading of tawhid. Ma'rifat-e Kalami, 15(1), 49–66. https://doi.org/10.22034/kalami.2024.5001110

Snow, S. (1998). Snow. *Benford, Robert D." Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." International Social Movement Research*, *1*, 197-217.

Steinbock, A. J. (1995). *Home and beyond: Generative phenomenology after Husserl*. Northwestern University Press.

Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and politics. Cambridge University Press.

Taufiqurrahman. (2023). Epistemology Ta'wil: a Study of Hassan Hanafi's Ideas in Interpreting Al-Qur'an. *QOF*, *7*(2), 225–244. https://doi.org/10.30762/qof.v7i2.1376

Tavassoli, H. and Mowahedi, R. (2025). From Husserlian Epoch to Revolutionary Praxis: A Critical Analysis of Hassan Hanafi's Methodology in the Project From Belief to Revolution. *12- Studies Religion Muslems*, *11*(22), 85-109. [In Persian]

Vahabzadeh, P. (2003). *Articulated experiences: Toward a radical phenomenology of contemporary social movements*. State University of New York Press.

Vahabzadeh, P. (2009). Ultimate referentiality: Radical phenomenology and the new interpretative sociology. *Philosophy & social criticism*, *35*(4), 447-465.

Wijaya, R., & Hidayat, M. R. (2024). Kuntowijoyo's Islamic Epistemology and Its Implications in Islamic Thought. *Al-Banjari: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman*, *23*(1), 1-15.

Yasna, I. (2025, November 12). *Ambivalent Normality: The We-Experience of Destroyed Lifeworlds. The Stayer Project*. XV International Congress of the Spanish Society for Phenomenology 'Normality, normativity, lifeworld", University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de Mallorca. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17914728

Zulkarnain, & Mustafa, M. (2019). Prophetic paradigm: An alternative for integrating science and religion. *Jurnal Filsafat Indonesia*, 1(1)